DAY 515 IN CAPTIVITY: Summit of Major Sunni Arab Nations in Cairo, Shabak Releases October 7th Report, IDF Report on Battle for Kfar Aza, Boston Scientific Purchases SoniVie Ltd.
Tel Aviv Diary, March 4, 2025
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Our Next ZOOM BRIEFING will take place on Sunday, March 9th
6PM Israel Time • 4PM GB • 11AM EST • 8AM PST
Invitations will go out on Sunday morning
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Major Sunni Arab nations convened an emergency summit to strategize the future of Gaza. Egypt reportedly proposed a plan for a pan-Arab force to aid in reinstating the Palestinian Authority after its forces undergo training in Egypt. This plan anticipates a reconstruction phase for Gaza spanning four to five years, financed by both Arab and international donors.
Under the Arab nations’ plan, technocrats would oversee the daily governance of Gaza. The primary flaw in the proposal is its failure to address the disarmament of Hamas. There is no conceivable scenario in which Israel would agree to rebuilding Gaza while Hamas remains armed.
Amidst these developments, reports suggest that as relations between Trump and Putin show signs of improvement (though they were not previously strained), Putin has now agreed to attempt brokering a deal between Trump and Iran. In response, Senator Lindsey Graham stated, “There is zero chance of reaching an agreement with the Iranians on nuclear weapons. The Nazi Ayatollahs want to destroy Israel. President Trump must give Israel the ability to destroy the Iranian nuclear program.” Graham is expected to maintain this steadfast position— until Trump changes his mind.
FORMER HOSTAGES ARRIVE IN DC, WITH HOPES OF MEETING PRESIDENT TRUMP
Several recently released hostages have arrived in Washington, with expectations that they will meet President Trump this evening. Meanwhile, reports indicate that Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff will return to the Middle East on Sunday.
ADDITIONAL OCTOBER 7 REPORTS
The dominant news story both today and yesterday has centered on the reports released regarding October 7th. Today, I have shared a summary of the General Security Services Report, as well the attack on Kibbutz Kfar Aza. They are lengthy, these report summaries are worth reading to have a comprehensive understanding of the events and the missteps involved.
SUMMARY OF THE SHABAK REPORT (General Security Services)
ON THE OCTOBER 7TH DISASTER
The Shin Bet security agency has published a comprehensive summary of its investigations into the intelligence failures preceding Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. The report reveals significant shortcomings within the organization while also highlighting external factors that contributed to the agency's inability to prevent the devastating assault.
Internal Investigations and Findings
The investigations were conducted through two parallel processes: internal reviews by each Shin Bet unit and an assessment by an external team comprising former senior agency officials and independent experts. Together, these investigations produced a series of findings, conclusions, and recommendations aimed at addressing the intelligence failures.
Critical Intelligence Gaps
One of the most concerning revelations in the report is that Hamas's invasion plans had been detected by Israeli intelligence in both 2018 and 2022. However, these plans were never processed as an imminent threat, resulting in a critical lack of preparation. The Shin Bet acknowledged failing to fully comprehend the scope and nature of Hamas's intentions, despite having access to intelligence that, in retrospect, should have triggered a more robust response.
The report also noted that the agency failed to properly integrate crucial data from the Military Intelligence Directorate regarding potential threats from Hamas. Even when the Shin Bet received alerts about unusual mobile phone activity among Hamas terrorists in Gaza, it did not respond with sufficient urgency or thoroughness.
Key Factors Behind the Intelligence Failure
The Shin Bet's investigation identified several specific reasons for its failure to provide warning of Hamas's attack:
Hamas's ground invasion plans, documented in what became known as the "Jericho's Walls" document, were mishandled over several years. These plans were never translated into concrete scenarios for which the military and Shin Bet could prepare and train.
An ambiguous division of responsibilities between the IDF and Shin Bet created confusion about which organization should provide warnings about a potential war. This problem was exacerbated by Hamas's evolution from a smaller terrorist group to a more sophisticated military force.
The Shin Bet's operational focus and methodologies were primarily designed to foil individual terror attacks rather than counter a military-scale assault.
Gaps in Recruiting and Deploying Human Agents: Due to limited access to the field and a reliance on remote intelligence gathering, there were significant gaps in human intelligence (HUMINT) recruitment and activation. These limitations prevented the detection or warning of unusual enemy movements in Gaza. A major setback occurred in 2018, when Hamas successfully uncovered and disrupted intelligence operations, particularly during the Khan Younis incident and a counterintelligence operation against an inter-regional Israeli effort. Despite subsequent efforts to rebuild HUMINT infrastructure and recruit sources on a larger scale, Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security agency) struggled to maximize its human intelligence capabilities due to long-standing operational restrictions in Gaza, making agent recruitment and activation exceedingly difficult—especially in recent years.
During the critical night between October 6 and 7, there were significant gaps in information handling, intelligence integration, and coordination with the IDF. Operations did not follow standard protocols, resulting in a breakdown of effective intelligence fusion.
Broader Context and Contributing Factors
The investigation also examined the conditions that enabled Hamas to build up its forces and ultimately decide to launch the October 7 attack:
Israel's policy toward Gaza prioritized maintaining periods of quiet, inadvertently allowing Hamas to undertake a massive military buildup.
The flow of money from Qatar to Gaza, including funds that reached Hamas's military wing, strengthened the organization's capabilities.
A gradual erosion of Israel's deterrence posture, combined with an over-reliance on intelligence and defensive measures rather than proactive offensive initiatives, created vulnerability.
Several catalysts influenced Hamas's decision to attack, including Israeli actions at the Temple Mount, the treatment of Palestinian prisoners, and a perception that Israeli society had become weakened and divided.
Leadership Accountability
Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar took personal responsibility for the failures, stating unequivocally that the agency “did not prevent the October 7 massacre.” In a somber acknowledgment of the gravity of the situation, Bar added, “As the head of the agency, I will carry this heavy burden for the rest of my life.”
Bar also emphasized that a complete understanding of the failures would require a broader investigation examining the interactions between security agencies and political leadership—suggesting that the full scope of responsibility extends beyond the Shin Bet alone.
REPORT ON THE ATTACK ON KFAR AZA
Casualties and Hostages: 62 Kfar Aza residents, including five soldiers and a Shin Bet member, and 18 security personnel were killed. 19 civilians were taken hostage.
Defense and Response:
The Kfar Aza alert squad of 18 members was the initial defense, but seven were killed.
A regional force with a tank arrived at 7:25 a.m., but couldn't fully assess the situation and eventually left.
The first IDF force, a small contingent, arrived around 8:30 a.m., but was insufficient to regain control.
The arrival of 30 additional Israeli forces by 10:30 a.m. began to form more resistance, but they were outnumbered.
Reinforcements reached 110 soldiers by 11:00 a.m., nearly evening the odds.
IDF Force Buildup and Operations:
By noon, the IDF had around 180 soldiers, gaining a slight advantage, but 55 residents had already been killed.
Around 2:00 p.m., the IDF had a clear numerical advantage with approximately 400 soldiers.
By 5:30 p.m., the IDF had about 700 soldiers against 50 Hamas terrorists.
At midnight, Israeli forces numbered 1,180.
Lack of Coordination and Command: Despite the presence of battalion and brigade commanders, no senior officer took control, leading to chaos. Troops lacked proper combat gear and clear orders. There was little coordination among the 24 units involved.
Terrorist Objectives and Actions: The initial wave of terrorists aimed to kill as many Israelis as possible. The second wave focused on taking hostages, primarily from the northern neighborhood. Terrorists set fire to safe rooms.
Airstrikes: Seven airstrikes were carried out, but most occurred after the majority of residents had already been killed.
Duration of the Battle: The last resident was murdered on Saturday at 6 p.m., and the final soldier was killed on Tuesday afternoon. The last terrorist inside Kfar Aza was killed on Tuesday at 5:30 p.m.
Terrorist Casualties: 101 terrorist bodies were found inside the kibbutz, but most attackers escaped back to Gaza. Approximately 150 Gazan terrorists were killed in Kfar Aza or the surrounding area.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT: The IDF probe revealed significant failures in intelligence, preparedness, and coordination, which allowed Hamas to infiltrate and capture Kfar Aza. The community was left without adequate protection for several hours, resulting in numerous casualties and abductions. The IDF's response was slow and disorganized, prolonging the battle and delaying the evacuation of residents
Here is a detailed timeline of the events that occurred during the Hamas attack on Kibbutz Kfar Aza, as revealed by the IDF probes:
6:29AM: Hamas launched approximately 960 rockets and missiles at IDF positions along the border, including the Kfar Aza area. Simultaneously, Hamas broke through the border fence in 114 locations.
6:30AM: Barrage of rockets and mortars target Kfar Aza.
6:35 - 6:43AM: Breaches in the border fence occurred near Kfar Aza.
6:42AM: Six Hamas terrorists landed in Kfar Aza using motorized paragliders and began firing at residents.
6:45AM: Three IDF vehicles were instructed to reach Kfar Aza, but only one attempted to reach the kibbutz while the other two fought terrorists in Sderot.
6:50AM: Terrorists breached two entrances to Kfar Aza using pickup trucks and dropped off terrorists in the southern and new neighborhoods. David “Kachko” Katzir, 72, was murdered, becoming the first victim of the massacre.
6:55AM: Members of the local alert squad rushed to the armory to retrieve weapons as heavy fighting erupted.
7:00AM: Approximately 50-80 terrorists were inside Kfar Aza.
7:01AM: An IDF tank was instructed to reach Kfar Aza.
7:25AM: The tank positioned itself outside the community and opened fire on approaching terrorists.
7:28AM: Dorrit Wertheim, responsible for distributing emergency messages, was murdered.
7:30AM: Another 150 Hamas Nukhba terrorists infiltrated the kibbutz, entering through a third breach near the Young Generation neighborhood. The attackers went house to house, killing residents and setting fire to safe rooms.
7:34AM: A first text message was sent to residents warning them of a terrorist infiltration.
8:00AM: Approximately 150 Hamas terrorists were inside the kibbutz, with 37 residents already murdered.
8:10AM: The local security team stopped functioning.
8:15AM: The first group of 18 troops from Golani’s 13th Battalion were instructed to reach Kfar Aza.
8:30AM: The first IDF force arrived—a small, outnumbered contingent. Up to this point, Hamas terrorists had murdered 37 people in the community, including seven local security officers.
8:33AM: The Golani troops entered the community in a Namer APC and reached the southern neighborhood.
8:40AM: A group of three troops entered Kfar Aza, heading for the new neighborhoods in the southwest.
8:42AM: The first attack helicopter was deployed, conducting a strike to isolate the kibbutz from external threats.
9:44AM: Another group of five security personnel, from the police and IDF, entered the community and tried to reach the "young generation" neighborhood.
9:50AM: More Hamas terrorists breached the Kfar Aza security fence near the "young generation" neighborhood and began to abduct civilians.
10:00AM: Approximately 250 Hamas terrorists were in the kibbutz, opposed by only some 30 security personnel.
10:20AM: Police officers battled terrorists at the main entrance to Kfar Aza, while Hamas members moved freely with no resistance in the "young generation" neighborhood.
10:20AM: The tank that had positioned itself outside the community was instructed to leave and assist another force elsewhere.
10:34AM: Approximately 25 members of the elite Sayeret Matkal and Duvdevan commando units entered Kfar Aza.
10:35AM: One Duvdevan soldier was killed and another five were wounded.
10:39AM: Four Sayeret Matkal soldiers were killed after a terrorist opened fire on them.
10:45AM: Additional forces from the IDF’s Maglan unit, Golani, and police entered Kfar Aza. However, none of them were aware of the other forces inside the community.
10:46AM: The commander of the elite Maglan unit arrived at the kibbutz with a small force, along with undercover officers from the Israel Police’s Southern District. Simultaneously, a force from the Paratroopers' 890th Battalion entered the kibbutz.
11:00AM: Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfuss arrived at the kibbutz by chance and fought alongside Maglan soldiers for about an hour before leaving to assume command of the wider battle zone.
11:24AM: Chief Superintendent Shimon Portal, an intelligence officer from the Israel Police’s Southern District, arrived at the kibbutz to rescue his daughter and other young people trapped in the Young Generation neighborhood. Additional police forces arrived.
11:42AM: A larger group of 53 Duvdevan soldiers also joined.
11:48AM: A second Duvdevan force entered Kfar Aza with 53 regular soldiers. During the two-hour period from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m., despite the arrival of initial reinforcements, 18 residents were murdered, 19 were abducted to Gaza and seven soldiers were killed. Only 18 civilians were successfully evacuated from the kibbutz during this time.
12:00PM: IDF reinforcements had reached around 180, finally having a slight advantage over the invaders, but by this point 55 Kfar Aza residents had already been killed out of the 64 eventual total.
12:50PM: The first Israeli troops reached the "young generation" neighborhood after the kidnappings had concluded.
1:30PM: Brig. Gen. Shomer joined forces with the Paratroopers’ 202nd Battalion.
1:52PM.: Lt. Col. Tomer Greenberg led a force of around 50 soldiers from Duvdevan and Sayeret Matkal into the Young Generation neighborhood.
2:00PM–4:00PM: More than 700 soldiers were in the kibbutz, including Givati Brigade Commander Col. Liron Batito, who joined the fighting. Yet no one considered deploying forces to isolate the area. Many terrorists remained hidden in the surrounding fields, launching attacks on soldiers into the night, including along the kibbutz’s perimeter fence.
4:00PM: A unit from the elite Shaldag reconnaissance force was dispatched to locate 10-month-old twins from the Berdichevsky family, whose parents, Itay and Hadar, were murdered that morning. The infants are found crying by IDF soldiers and finally evacuated to safety at 8:00 p.m. by Lt. Col. Greenberg.
5:00PM: Givati Brigade Commander Col. Liron Batito assigned combat sectors within the kibbutz, working alongside the Paratroopers' 202nd Battalion. Meanwhile, the Commando Brigade commander assumed leadership of the battle in Kfar Aza.
5:30PM: The IDF had significant numbers supremacy reaching around 700 soldiers fighting against only 50 from Hamas who were becoming increasingly cornered.
5:52PM: Troops exchanged fire with a group of terrorists driving toward them in a vehicle. It was later found that one person in the car, Eliyahu Orgad, was being abducted by those terrorists. He was killed in the exchange of fire.
6:00PM: Eliyahu Orgad, 72, was killed—likely by IDF fire—when troops target a vehicle carrying Hamas terrorists attempting to flee toward Gaza. Unbeknownst to the soldiers, Orgad was restrained inside the car and hidden from view. Meanwhile, hundreds of kibbutz residents remain trapped in safe rooms, still awaiting evacuation.
6:30PM: 765 Israeli forces in the community.
6:41PM: An additional 300 reservists from the 55th Brigade arrived and began searching the kibbutz’s empty industrial area.
7:00PM: The Commando Brigade’s command center was established at the Alonit gas station near the kibbutz entrance.
8:00PM: The 10-month-old twins were evacuated to safety by Lt. Col. Greenberg.
9:00PM: A kibbutz resident, having spent the entire day hiding in his safe room, cautiously emerged and spotted a military vehicle. As he slowly approached, he opened the rear door to ask for help, but the soldiers, fearing he is a terrorist, opened fire, wounding him moderately. Another soldier, realizing the mistake, kicked the wounded man away from the line of fire to save him but is also shot in the leg in the process.
11:00PM: The evacuation of most Kfar Aza residents finally began.
11:30PM: A young Maglan officer created a WhatsApp group named "Kfar Aza Command & Control" and added dozens of commanders from different units—IDF, Shin Bet and police—who were operating in the kibbutz but had no direct communication with each other.
Midnight Dawn: Civilians were stranded outside the kibbutz at the Alonit complex or forced to hitchhike out. An officer redirected bulldozers and a reservist tank unit to help breach the fortified safe rooms.
OCTOBER 8, 3:20AM: Residents Nadav Alon and Hadar Haniya were mistakenly attacked by soldiers.
OCTOBER 8, 5:37AM: A deadly clash occurred between Shayetet 13 forces and terrorists near the kibbutz swimming pool.
OCTOBER 8, 8:00AM: The IDF had managed to evacuate 60% of the kibbutz residents, but hundreds remained trapped. Dozens of Hamas terrorists were still inside Kfar Aza, and the battle continued throughout the day.
OCTOBER 9, MORNING: 10-20 terrorists were still in the kibbutz.
OCTOBER 9, 11:15AM: A soldier with the Nahal Brigade was killed in an exchange of fire.
OCTOBER 10, 5:00PM: Troops killed an already wounded Hamas terrorist who was hiding out in the kibbutz’s new neighborhood.
OCTOBER 10, AFTERNOON: The military escorted journalists to see the destruction in the community.
OCTOBER 10, 6:00PM: Troops from the 28th Battalion of the brigade spot and kill the last wounded terrorist, who is still clutching a knife.
GOVERNMENT’S LATE-NIGHT MANEUVER ALTERS JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
While most public attention has been focused on the hostages remaining in Gaza, the government has quietly revived judicial reform. Last night, a pivotal law was passed to overhaul the appointment process for judicial ombudsmen. Although there was widespread agreement that the previous system was flawed, the new law now allows the government to appoint these officials, paving the way for politicians to potentially investigate judges.
Bringing Israeli Innovation to the Forefront with IsraelTech.com
Today we are excited to announce a new collaboration with israeltech.com. Launched in 2024 by seasoned entrepreneur Yoel Israel, IsraelTech.com was created to more vividly showcase the narrative of Israel as a Start-up Nation. Since its inception, IsraelTech has published 40 detailed interviews with top venture capitalists, founders, and key figures, focusing on pivotal developments in the ecosystem.
IsraelTech's mission is to foster open and constructive dialogue about Israeli technology and make it accessible globally through social media. You can follow them [here]. Today, we feature one of their in-depth interviews. In the upcoming weeks, we will include excerpts of their weekly videos, with links to their full interviews.
BUSINESS
SoniVie Ltd.
Boston Scientific Corporation announced it will acquire SoniVie Ltd., a medical device company, for approximately $360 million upfront for the 90% stake it does not already own, plus up to $180 million upon achieving a regulatory milestone. The deal is expected to close in the first half of 2025, subject to customary conditions.
SoniVie has developed the TIVUS™ Intravascular Ultrasound System, an investigational technology designed to denervate nerves surrounding blood vessels to treat hypertension and other hypertensive disorders, including renal artery denervation (RDN). The system uses ultrasound energy, which may provide deeper tissue penetration and faster procedures compared to radiofrequency energy.
Hypertension, closely linked to overactivity of the sympathetic nervous system, is a major risk factor for cardiovascular disease. Current treatments, such as lifestyle changes and medications, often fall short in controlling blood pressure. The TIVUS system aims to address this gap by performing RDN, reducing renal nerve activity and potentially offering an alternative or adjunctive therapy.
Boston Scientific sees this acquisition as a strategic addition to its interventional cardiology portfolio. “Renal denervation for hypertension is an exciting medical advancement, supported by positive clinical trials,” said Lance Bates, SVP & President, Interventional Cardiology Therapies. “The ultrasound-based TIVUS system complements our portfolio and provides opportunities for future innovation.”
SoniVie recently launched the THRIVE global IDE pivotal trial after reporting positive results from a U.S. and Israel-based IDE pilot trial. The TIVUS system generates precise ultrasound energy that ablates nerve bundles outside the arteries, reducing sympathetic hormone activity, relaxing blood vessels, and lowering blood pressure. Boston Scientific previously held a 10% stake in SoniVie as a strategic investor.
Bank Leumi
Bank Leumi, alongside Bank Hapoalim, experienced an excellent year.
Bank Leumi released its financial results today, announcing a record annual profit of NIS 9.8 billion in 2024, the highest in its history and among Israeli banks. Similar to Bank Hapoalim, Leumi has also introduced profit targets for 2025-2026, aiming for an annual profit between NIS 9-11 billion and a return on equity (ROE) of 15%-16%.
Dividend and Financial Performance
Due to strong results, Leumi will distribute a Q4 dividend of NIS 980 million, comprising NIS 706 million in cash dividends, with the remainder through share buybacks, totaling 40% of the net quarterly profit.
In 2024, Leumi distributed NIS 4 billion in dividends.
The return on equity (ROE) in 2024 was 16.9%, compared to 13.7% in 2023.
Q4 2024 ROE reached 16.2%, up from 13.8% in Q4 2023.
Leumi has set a minimum dividend payout ratio of 50% of net profit annually for 2025-2026 and plans for an annual credit portfolio growth of 8%-10%.
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TRAVEL ACROSS ISRAEL
Achziv
Our next destination on our journey is Achziv, a site of historical significance along the northern coast of Israel, situated between Nahariya and Rosh Hanikra, close to the Lebanese border. Achziv offers visitors a blend of history and leisure with its ancient settlement, a national park, and a contemporary beachside attraction called “Achzivland.”
Achziv, an ancient city with over 3,000 years of history, was originally a Canaanite and later Phoenician city noted in Egyptian and Assyrian records. It is mentioned in the Book of Joshua (Judges 1:31) as part of the territory belonging to the tribe of Asher, though it was never fully conquered. During the Hellenistic and Roman periods, it served as a small port city that linked Mediterranean trade routes. In the Crusader period, it was known as “Casal Imbert” and operated as a fortified settlement under Christian rule.
During the Ottoman era and the British Mandate, the site remained a small fishing village until 1948, when the Arab village of Az-Zeeb was depopulated amidst the Israeli War of Independence.
Achziv National Park is a protected coastal reserve combining historical ruins, stunning beaches, and marine biodiversity. The park is managed by the Israel Nature and Parks Authority and is a popular destination for families, snorkelers, and history enthusiasts.
Key Attractions:
Ancient Ruins: Archaeological remains from the Phoenician, Persian, and Crusader periods.
Beaches & Lagoons: Natural rock pools, sandy shores, and clear Mediterranean waters perfect for swimming.
Marine Life: Home to various sea turtles, fish, and coral reefs.
Hiking & Camping: Trails along the rugged cliffs of Rosh Hanikra, plus camping facilities.
“Achzivland”: The Unofficial Micronation
In 1971, Eli Avivi, an eccentric Israeli, founded “Achzivland,” an unofficial micro-nation on part of the ancient Achziv site. He constructed a museum and guesthouse, declaring independence and even issuing his own passports (as a joke). While it was never legally recognized, Achzivland evolved into a countercultural tourist destination, attracting hippies, artists, and celebrities visiting over the decades. Following Avivi's death in 2018, the Israeli government assumed control of the area. However, parts of Achzivland continue to operate as a quirky guesthouse and cultural site, preserving its unique legacy.
How to Visit Achzivland …
Location: Off Highway 4, about 5 km north of Nahariya.
Hours: 8:00 AM – 5:00 PM (varies by season).
Activities: Swimming, hiking, camping, archaeological tours.
Nearby Attractions:
Rosh Hanikra grottoes (stunning limestone sea caves).
Betzet Beach (a quieter alternative for swimming and camping).