DAY 513 IN CAPTIVITY: Ceasefire with Hamas Ends; Israel Halts Aid to Gaza; Hamas Rejects Extension of Phase I, Returned Hostages, to Visit White House; Key October 7th Reports Are Realeased
Tel Aviv Diary, March 2, 2025
The ceasefire has officially ended, but fighting has not resumed. Hamas has rejected the U.S. proposal to extend the ceasefire through Ramadan and Passover in exchange for the release of a substantial number of hostages. Hamas claims that Israel is violating the current agreement by refusing to discuss the second stage or withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor. Netanyahu refuses to discuss Stage Two of the agreement.
This morning, the Israeli government announced it was cutting off humanitarian aid to Gaza until a new agreement is reached. The problem is, based on the amount of aid that has entered over the course of the past month, Hamas has six months worth of supplies. There are also concerns that halting aid could negatively impact the hostages. It is completely unclear why Hamas would agree to continue releasing hostages without a clear path toward its central goal—remaining in power in Gaza while Israel withdraws. Currently, Egypt has proposed a two-week extension of the ceasefire in exchange for three live hostages and three who are deceased.
RELEASED HOSTAGE, ELI SHARABI
One of the most talked-about events in Israel over the past few days was an hour-long interview given by Eli Sharabi—who was released by Hamas on February 8th after 491 days in captivity—to veteran investigative journalist, Ilana Dayan, on Israeli Channel 12. At the interview's outset, Sharabi encouraged Dayan to ask absolutely any question she wished— saying “with me you don’t have to walk on eggshells.”
Sharabi described the extreme hardship of his captivity—the physical pain, hunger, darkness, and moments of isolation from others. The interview, with English translations, made its way to the White House, where President Trump was deeply moved by it. Trump invited Eli Sharabi to meet him at the White House. Miriam Adelson, the widow of Sheldon Adelson and a significant influence on Trump’s efforts on behalf of the hostages, will provide her private jet for Sharabi's journey to Washington. This meeting could have profound consequences. If Sharabi convinces Trump to prioritize freeing the hostages first, before dealing with Hamas, Trump could pressure Netanyahu to act accordingly—despite the political risks.
PRO-ISRAEL ADVOCATE DISCUSSES RISKS OF “AMERICA FIRST” ISOLATIONISM
Adam Milstein, an Israeli-American businessman, has had significant success in the U.S. and has generously supported pro-Israel organizations via his foundation. Milstein was the driving force behind the Israeli-American Council, cementing his pro-Israel credentials. Additionally, Milstein is a strong supporter of President Trump. Therefore, it is noteworthy that in his latest newsletter, he chose to republish an article he had initially written for The Jerusalem Post, entitled, “The Growing Threat of ‘America First’ Isolationism: A Danger to the U.S., Israel, and Their Alliance.”
Longtime readers know that I actively opposed President Trump in previous election cycles. My stance softened somewhat in this past election cycle, but that's a topic for another day. The primary reason for my opposition was precisely this: I believed—and continue to believe—that Trump strongly advocates for an “America First” policy. The initial month of the Trump presidency has only reinforced that belief. Under Trump, America is clearly retreating from global engagement, dismantling USAID—despite its many benefits (and some drawbacks)—and inflicting considerable damage to NATO.
Until now, many of Trump’s pro-Israel policies have overshadowed these concerns among some of his supporters. However, Milstein’s warnings highlight exactly why I opposed Trump in the past. I always felt that while he might be great for Israel in the short term, he could be very dangerous in the long run.
An “America First” policy will eventually grow tired of Israel, and beyond that, a globally isolated America will have very few friends. If Israel is too closely identified with an isolationist America—as we saw with Israel’s UN vote against Ukraine—our already precarious position in the world could become even more dangerous.
What transpired at the White House on Friday was unprecedented. In an attack that appeared meticulously planned, Vance and Trump publicly humiliated Zelensky in a disgusting and blatant display of support for Putin. This incident should send a chill down the spine of every Israeli or supporter of Israel. That said, in the short term, we are all placing our hopes on what Trump might be able to accomplish for us in the coming weeks.
IDF REPORTS REGARDING ITS FAILURES ON OCTOBER 7TH
The Army reports were released—sort of. Why do I say “sort of”? Because no actual reports were made public. Instead, the Army provided detailed presentations to military reporters, who then reported what they were told. This means we are all depending on secondary sources rather than direct access to the primary documents.
Taking all these reports into account, we now have detailed conclusions on the failures that led to that horrific day as well as a timeline of the events, almost minute by minute. The sheer volume of information is overwhelming, but it is all available for those who want to read it below. For those who want to listen to an audio summary, I have used Notebook LM (a Google-made research tool), to create a podcast summarizing the report. While it’s not exactly what I would say, it covers the content well. You’ll just have to take the section at the end where it talks about the future and the chances for peace with a large grain of salt.
Later this week, I will present my own concise analysis of the lessons learned from that day.
Here is a summary of the IDF’s findings:
Lack of Preparedness: The IDF did not consider the scenario of a broad surprise attack, deeming it unlikely, and was therefore not prepared for it. The surprise stemmed from the attack itself, the large number of Hamas militants, their mobility, and their planned cruelty.
Intelligence and Conceptual Failures: The intelligence directorate (AMAN) had a widening gap in its understanding of Hamas' intentions and actual plans. There was a failure to connect the various intelligence signs before the attack. The report also mentions a faulty perception of Hamas, which was seen as deterred and interested in civilian benefits, willing to de-escalate, and that the conflict could be managed.
Flawed Security Concepts: The IDF relied on incorrect assumptions, such as viewing the Gaza Strip as a secondary threat. There was a sense of intelligence superiority and control over the situation, with full confidence in early warning before any attack.
Inadequate Force Deployment and Border Security: There was a reliance on insufficient defense components and a low number of soldiers on the border.
Hamas's Planning and Deception: Hamas had been planning the attack since 2016 and accelerated these plans in 2022, with multiple postponements for various reasons. Hamas aimed to deceive the enemy (i.e. Israel) into thinking it was interested in de-escalation and economic prosperity.
Failures in Threat Perception: AMAN's Research Division had a significant and prolonged gap in understanding Hamas, interpreting Hamas's avoidance of war as deterrence and failing to recognize the preparations for a broad attack.
Missed Opportunities and "Warning Signs": The report identifies several missed "warning signs" that could have corrected the prevailing misconceptions, including the rise of Yahya Sinwar, Hamas's victory in the 2021 "Guardian of the Walls" operation, and Hamas's consistent refusal to join the Islamic Jihad in escalations against Israel.
Systemic Issues in the Intelligence Culture: The report points to a non-skeptical intelligence culture, a research method that wasn't critical, an illusion of certainty stemming from technological advancement, and a failure to investigate past failures.
Resource Allocation and Prioritization: The IDF faced decreasing resources amid increasing threats, leading to gaps in security responses. Priority was given to threats from Iran and Hezbollah over Gaza.
Limited Preparedness for Large-Scale Attacks: The IDF and specifically the Southern Command, were not prepared for a large-scale attack scenario. The Southern Command was prepared to respond to up to 8 different incursion points.
Failures on the Night Before the Attack: A comprehensive intelligence assessment on the night before the attack concluded that an immediate event was unlikely, with no one challenged this assessment or raised the alert level.
Inadequate Situation Assessment and Information Sharing: The Operations Directorate and the General Staff (Kiriya) lacked a basic understanding of the combat zones for hours after the attack began, and it was not clear which events were the most severe.
Air Force and Navy Deficiencies: The Air Force was fully activated upon the outbreak of the attack. The Navy did not fulfill its defense mission, with terrorists infiltrating Israeli territory via the sea. (more on that below)
Significant Disparity in Forces: During the initial hours of the attack, the number of Hamas militants greatly outnumbered the IDF forces present.
During the initial response to the Hamas attack, several failures occurred, impacting the effectiveness of the defense and the ability to contain the situation.
Slow Deployment of Forces: Although the IDF activated its standing forces relatively quickly, the actual arrival of these forces to the conflict zones was significantly delayed. Troops needed time to travel from their homes to bases, organize, and then reach the affected areas. In many instances, forces en route were engaged by Hamas militants, further impeding their progress.
Lack of Situational Awareness: The central command (Kiriya) lacked a basic understanding of the combat zones for hours after the attack began, and it was not clear which events were the most severe. The initial reports of the events did not accurately portray what was happening. For instance, reports concerning “Re'em" referred to multiple locations including a kibbutz, a junction, a parking lot that was the site of the Nova music festival, and the command of the Gaza division. This lack of clarity hindered the ability to allocate resources effectively. The central command also did not have an accurate picture of where Hamas forces were located.
Inadequate Preparedness of Frontline Units: The "כוננות עם שחר" (dawn readiness) in the Gaza Division was not different or more prepared than on any regular day. The division did not increase its readiness for an infiltration.
Communication Issues: There was a problematic operational culture that relied on cellular devices, bypassing standard procedures for situation assessments. Information was disseminated through broad chat groups without confirming receipt.
Compromised Command Structure: The command structure in the Southern Brigade was severely affected, with the brigade commander killed and many other officers injured. This hampered command and control in a critical sector.
The Israeli Navy experienced critical failures during the Hamas attack on October 7. Despite a swift response from Navy forces that eliminated about half of the Hamas terrorists who attempted to infiltrate by sea, 16 terrorists successfully made it ashore and murdered 17 people at Zikim beach.
Specific failures and shortcomings include:
Failure to Defend the Coast: The navy did not fulfill its mission of defending Israel from the sea.
Inadequate Preparation: The Navy was not prepared for such a large-scale surprise attack, but only for a more limited infiltration scenario.
Insufficiently Lethal Weapons: Navy officers acknowledged that their weapons weren't lethal enough.
Restrictive Engagement Rules: A commander hesitated before opening fire on an enemy boat due to restrictive engagement rules in place since 2014’s Operation Protective Edge.
Delayed Threat Recognition: A Navy lookout took the initiative to call the Zikim security chief, as forces had failed to stop the terrorists.
Routine Alert Status: On the morning of the attack, the navy was in a state of full routine readiness.
Delayed Leadership Updates: The commander of the Navy was not updated on the situation during the night, even though his RLS (likely, aide) was informed.
Limited Impact on Coastal Infiltration: Though the Navy destroyed five of seven Hamas boats, some terrorists still reached the shore. Two boats reached the shore, and the attacks on the combatants had only partial success.
Subsequent Casualties: 17 Israeli civilians were murdered on Zikim beach.
Despite eliminating several terrorists, the Navy failed to prevent a deadly breach that resulted in civilian casualties.
The sequence of events on October 7, according to the sources, unfolded as follows:
6:29AM: Navy surveillance detected hundreds of large Palestinian fishing boats along the coast, under whose cover Hamas naval commandos launched their attack.
6:29AM: The first wave of 1,175 Hamas terrorists, mostly from the elite Nukhba forces, infiltrated southern Israel under cover of a 1,400-rocket and mortar barrage. Their initial targets included IDF outposts, the Gaza Division headquarters, an intelligence base near Urim, the Sderot police station, key intersections, and major roads to secure control over the western Negev.
6:31AM: The IDF’s supervising command post was activated in the IDF’s underground headquarters in Tel Aviv. At the same time, immediate readiness protocols for the Air Force and elite emergency units were enacted. Also, at this time, a Hamas boat was detected 1,500 meters south of the maritime border and destroyed within 3 minutes.
6:33AM: The Ashdod naval base declared a confirmed terror attack from the sea, issuing an alert equivalent to the IDF’s highest-level ground incursion protocol.
6:35AM: The Air Force was ordered to deploy additional fighter jet crews beyond its standard readiness level.
6:37AM: The Navy requested that Israeli police evacuate Zikim beach and called on the Gaza Division to send infantry forces to secure the shore, in case some of the terrorists managed to breach Israel’s defenses.
6:38AM: The Gaza Division activated "Parash Pleshet," its highest-level infiltration alert, assuming the attack involved around 70 terrorists from four to eight locations. Over the next 14 minutes, the Operations Directorate gradually deployed all available reserve ground forces to the southern region.
6:43AM: The Air Force was immediately activated.
6:45AM: The first report of a ground incursion from northern Gaza reached IDF headquarters.
6:50AM: Up to this time, a total of 2 boats had been destroyed at sea.
7:00AM Southern Command was aware of 15 terror incidents occurring simultaneously along the border. The General Staff opened a dedicated attack coordination center to manage airstrikes from the headquarters.
7:00-9:00AM A second wave of approximately 600 Nukhba terrorists joined the invasion, under cover of 937 additional rocket and mortar strikes, mostly targeting Israeli communities near the border.
7:05AM: The IDF chief of staff’s military secretary sent an internal WhatsApp message to the Operations Directorate group, independently declaring: “We are at war”.
7:10AM.: The Air Force declared war.
7:13AM: The security coordinator of the Nova music festival reported to the IDF that 90% of attendees had been evacuated.
7:14AM: The Air Force conducted its first drone strike against terrorists near Netiv HaAsara.
7:15AM: The first aerial attack was carried out by a UAV that attacked militants near Netiv HaAsara.
7:26AM An officer updated IDF headquarters: “A breach at the Erez Crossing has resulted in two hostages being taken. There is ongoing combat in Sderot. The division is requesting deployment of every available combat unit to the southern region.” A senior officer at IDF headquarters responded: “Every IDF unit has been ordered to join you. Open routes for them and direct them where needed. We have activated troops from training bases”.
7:28AM: Brig. Gen. Shlomi Binder, head of the Operations Division within the Operations Directorate, ordered a full-scale military mobilization. An emergency deployment order was issued to send massive reinforcements to the western Negev.
7:30AM: Units from the 80th Division, responsible for the Egyptian border, arrived from the south to assist. Under the command of the Paran Brigade, a team of female tank operators prevented two Nukhba battalions from seizing communities in the Kerem Shalom area. By this time, the regular IDF force was activated and sent to the "Otef" (area around Gaza).
7:55AM: The first fighter jet strike targeted a Hamas tunnel near Netiv HaAsara.
7:58AM: Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif called on Gaza residents via local media: “Go and storm Israel. There is no border fence.” At that moment, the dramatic decision was made — to be officially executed an hour later — to seal the breached border at all costs using airstrikes.
8:00AM: Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman urgently requested additional reinforcements. IDF headquarters decided that two-thirds of the West Bank Division’s security forces would abandon their positions and be rushed south.
8:02AM: The first combat helicopter attack was carried out against a group of militants in the Re'im area.
8:17AM: The IDF established a command center dedicated to managing the hostage crisis. Also, at this time, the Operations Division directed AMAN to open a command center for prisoners of war and the missing.
8:29AM: Investigators later determined that at this stage, only 55% of active terror incidents in the Gaza border communities were being reported to IDF headquarters, further complicating the situational assessment.
8:30AM: Southern Command activated "Damocles’ Sword," an operation targeting Hamas’ command and control centers in Gaza to disrupt the ongoing invasion.
8:36AM: The Chief of Staff decided to send senior commanders to take control of the major cities: Sderot, Ashkelon, Netivot, Ofakim and Be'er Sheva.
8:40AM: The first evacuation of wounded by air force helicopters took place.
8:42AM: The supervising command center ordered the air force to target Hamas headquarters and leadership figures.
8:47AM: The first force of fighters was landed by air in the “Otef".
9:03AM: 14 aircraft were in the air over the Gaza Strip.
9:23AM: The Gaza Division was effectively overrun as Nukhba forces besieged its main command center near Kibbutz Re’im. The IDF decided to dispatch division and brigade commanders across the region, assigning each to oversee a major town or community that Hamas had seized, including Ofakim, Netivot, Sderot, and Be’er Sheva.
9:30AM: A new policy regarding rules of engagement was given to create a separation on the border and to not allow anything to enter Israel from Gaza or cross from Israel to Gaza. Anything attempting to do so was to be attacked.
9:40AM: Southern Command and the Air Force ordered an aerial lockdown of the breached border, authorizing fighter jets to kill anyone moving within a kilometer (0.6 miles) of the fence. The bombing began but did not fully halt the infiltration.
9:58AM: 24 aircraft were in the air.
10:00AM: By this hour, IDF headquarters was receiving reports on 61% of ongoing terror incidents in the southern region.
10:30AM: The IDF issued a broad call-up order for 360,000 reserve soldiers.
10:40AM: A bottleneck of military forces was identified in Sderot, where troops had gathered after seeing viral footage of terrorists in pickup trucks. The supervising post ordered them to disperse to active combat zones.
12:00PM The attack reached its peak as thousands more Hamas terrorists exploited still-open breaches in the border. By this point, approximately 5,500 terrorists had flooded into southern Israel.
1:00PM: The Hamas assault was largely halted, and the IDF began establishing a new defensive line. By 5:00 p.m., Southern Command announced that operational control over the western Negev had been restored, roads were secured, and the last remaining terrorist strongholds were encircled. [Although it required another two days to capture or kill all the remaining terrorists]
SYRIA
Israel is threatening to actively intervene in Syria on behalf of the Druze. It has issued a warning to the Syrian government against attacking the Druze in the Damascus suburb of Jaramana. While it's unclear what the future holds, the Druze have been steadfast allies of Israel, and they deserve our support wherever possible.
TZACHI EDAN AND SHLOMO MANTZUR
On Friday, Tzachi Edan was buried at Kibbutz Einat. Edan’s funeral procession began at Bloomfield Stadium in Tel Aviv, home ground of his favorite soccer team.
Today, Shlomo Mantzur (85), was laid to rest at Kibbutz Kissufim, the kibbutz he helped establish. Mantzur was murdered on Octotber 7th and his body was subsequently taken by Hamas to Gaza. President Herzog delivered a eulogy at this funeral
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Hamas was dishonorable and deadly serious. They used multiple tactical and strategic options to inflict maximal harm. Their depravity should result in their total eradication.